Respondable Risk and Incentives: Evidence from Executive Compensation
- 1 January 2004
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Traditional agency theory treats risk as pure measurement error, yielding the standard prediction of risk-incentive tradeoff. This paper proposes a model in whiKeywords
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