Partisanship in the setting and coordination of fiscal and monetary policies

This publication has 28 references indexed in Scilit:

• Checks and balances, and the supply of central bank independence
  European Economic Review, 1999
• Measuring central bank independence: a tale of subjectivity and of its consequences
  Oxford Economic Papers, 1998
• Central bank independence--conceptual clarifications and interim assessment
  Oxford Economic Papers, 1998
• The case for an independent European central bank: A reassessment of evidence and sources
  European Journal of Political Economy, 1998
• Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence, Coordinated Wage Bargaining, and European Monetary Union
  International Organization, 1998
• Wage Bargaining, Central Bank Independence, and the Real Effects of Money
  International Organization, 1998
• International and Domestic Constraints on Political Business Cycles in OECD Economies
  International Organization, 1998
• Counterfiscal policies and partisan politics: evidence from industrialized countries
  Applied Economics, 1997
• Partisan politics and public finance: Changes in public spending in the industrialized democracies, 1955–1989
  Public Choice, 1997
• Central bank independence: A paneldata approach
  Public Choice, 1996