Central bank independence--conceptual clarifications and interim assessment
- 1 July 1998
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Economic Papers
- Vol. 50 (3) , 307-334
- https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028649
Abstract
It is argued that credibility problems in macroeconomics hardly exist, and certainly do not motivate central bank independence. The Rogoff banker, and much work which follows should be interpreted as blueprints for good policy, not institutional reforms. There are likely to be significant but at present unquantified costs associated with central bank independence once the interaction of monetary and other policymakers is recognised. The evidence that central bank independence reduces inflation or brings other benefits is questionedThis publication has 6 references indexed in Scilit:
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