The bureaucratic and partisan behavior of independent central banks: German and international evidence

This publication has 19 references indexed in Scilit:

• FOMC VOTING BEHAVIOR AND ELECTORAL CYCLES: PARTISAN IDEOLOGY AND PARTISAN LOYALTY
  Economics & Politics, 1996
• CENTRAL BANKS‘ INDEPENDENCE: INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS, RANKINGS and CENTRAL BANKERS’ VIEWS
  Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 1994
• Partisan Monetary Policies: Presidential Influence Through the Power of Appointment
  The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1993
• Reliable and unreliable partisan appointees to the Board of Governors
  Public Choice, 1992
• SCREENING FOMC MEMBERS FOR THEIR BIASES AND DEPENDABILITY
  Economics & Politics, 1991
• Currency Competition and European Monetary Integration
  The Economic Journal, 1990
• The Federal Reserve as a Bureaucracy: An Examination of Expense-Preference Behavior
  Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1988
• Political Parties, World Demand, and Unemployment: Domestic and International Sources of Economic Activity
  American Political Science Review, 1985
• MYTHOLOGY AND CENTRAL BANKING
  Kyklos, 1973
• The choice of monetary instruments and the theory of bureaucracy
  Public Choice, 1972