Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection
- 31 January 2006
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Intermediation
- Vol. 15 (1) , 1-31
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2004.12.004
Abstract
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