Majority rule outcomes and the structure of debate in one-issue-at-a-time decision-making
- 1 December 1988
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 59 (3) , 239-252
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00118538
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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