The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring
- 1 January 2002
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 102 (1) , 70-83
- https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2819
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 9 references indexed in Scilit:
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