The Replacement of Scientific Theories: Reduction and Explication
- 1 December 1975
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 42 (4) , 349-372
- https://doi.org/10.1086/288658
Abstract
An examination of earlier views yields an account of theoretic change on which changes in theory which do involve changes in meanings of terms are classified as a special (and by no means exhaustive) case of theoretic change which, latter, is construed as a more general phenomenon. Only the general problem is given detailed consideration here. The account given considers the problem of how replacement of intensional theories by extensional ones may be treated within the general framework provided. Among its results is the conclusion that rational changes in a scientific theory may be cogently construed as determined by warranted decisions that a new theory is more adequate (than the old one it replaces) with regard to purposes for which a theory is sought.Keywords
This publication has 13 references indexed in Scilit:
- Vision and Revolution: A Postscript on KuhnPhilosophy of Science, 1972
- Attribute-Identities in MicroreductionsThe Journal of Philosophy, 1972
- The Comparability of Scientific TheoriesPhilosophy of Science, 1971
- Alternatives and Incommensurables: The Case of Darwin and KelvinPhilosophy of Science, 1971
- An Explication of ‘Explication’Philosophy of Science, 1968
- Approaches to ReductionPhilosophy of Science, 1967
- Quine, Synonymy and Logical TruthPhilosophy of Science, 1965
- Meaning and ActionPhilosophy of Science, 1963
- The Structure of ScienceAmerican Journal of Physics, 1961
- Counter-intuitivity and the method of analysisPhilosophical Studies, 1950