A model of political equilibrium in a representative democracy
- 1 June 1993
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 51 (2) , 195-209
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(93)90084-7
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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