Monitoring versus incentives
- 1 October 2001
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 45 (9) , 1741-1764
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(00)00051-9
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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