What Have We Learned from Market Design?
Top Cited Papers
- 20 February 2008
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 118 (527) , 285-310
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02121.x
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