The optimal size of a bank: Costs and benefits of diversification
- 1 October 2000
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 44 (9) , 1701-1726
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(99)00008-2
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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