Changing the Social Norm of Tax Compliance by Voting
- 5 May 1999
- Vol. 52 (2) , 141-171
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1999.tb01440.x
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 18 references indexed in Scilit:
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