An Analysis of Shareholder Agreements
- 1 March 2007
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 5 (1) , 93-121
- https://doi.org/10.1162/jeea.2007.5.1.93
Abstract
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