Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis
Top Cited Papers
- 15 July 2003
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Finance
- Vol. 58 (4) , 1445-1468
- https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00573
Abstract
We use a sample of 800 firms in eight East Asian countries to study the effect of ownership structure on value during the region's financial crisis. The crisis negatively impacted firms' investment opportunities, raising the incentives of controlling shareholders to expropriate minority investors. Crisis period stock returns of firms in which managers have high levels of control rights, but have separated their control and cash flow ownership, are 10–20 percentage points lower than those of other firms. The evidence is consistent with the view that ownership structure plays an important role in determining whether insiders expropriate minority shareholders.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 27 references indexed in Scilit:
- Resolution of corporate distress in East AsiaJournal of Empirical Finance, 2003
- Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large ShareholdingsThe Journal of Finance, 2002
- Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business GroupsThe Journal of Finance, 2002
- Performance consequences of mandatory increases in executive stock ownershipJournal of Financial Economics, 2002
- Ownership structure and corporate performancePublished by Elsevier ,2001
- The separation of ownership and control in East Asian CorporationsPublished by Elsevier ,2000
- Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performanceJournal of Financial Economics, 1999
- Were the Good Old Days That Good? Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great DepressionThe Journal of Finance, 1999
- Ownership structure, investment, and the corporate value: An empirical analysisPublished by Elsevier ,1998
- The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and ConsequencesJournal of Political Economy, 1985