Reputation and the Allocation of Ownership
- 1 July 2002
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 112 (481) , 539-558
- https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00729
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
- Relational Contracts and the Theory of the FirmThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002
- The firm as a subeconomyJournal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1999
- The Boundaries of the Firm RevisitedJournal of Economic Perspectives, 1998
- Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the FirmThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1998
- Power in a Theory of the FirmThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1998
- Why reputation favors joint ventures over vertical and horizontal integration A simple modelJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1995
- Property Rights and the Nature of the FirmJournal of Political Economy, 1990
- The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral IntegrationJournal of Political Economy, 1986
- The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual PerformanceJournal of Political Economy, 1981
- A Theory of Self-Enforcing AgreementsThe Journal of Business, 1980