Power, resolve and bargaining in international crises: A spatial theory
- 1 March 1990
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Interactions
- Vol. 15 (3-4) , 279-302
- https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629008434734
Abstract
In this paper the spatial model of crisis bargaining is utilized to derive a number of hypotheses relating the relative power and resolve of crisis participants to crisis outcomes. The resolve and two power variables are defined and the manner in which they are incorporated into the model is demonstrated. The model, which represents a synthesis of traditional utility based bargaining models and the spatial theory of voting, is then used to establish the theoretical linkages among these variables and all possible outcomes of international crises. Among the more interesting results is that crises in which one party is much more likely to win a war should one occur and the other party is much more resolved are extremely likely to end in war. The paper concludes with a discussion of the relevance of these findings to a number of topics in the international relations literature, including Schelling's strategy of commitment.Keywords
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