Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations
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- 1 July 2003
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Economic Studies
- Vol. 70 (3) , 649-665
- https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00260
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