A Pecking Order of Venture Capital Exits
- 1 April 2008
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We develop a model of exits from venture capital backed companies based on post-exit moral hazard. It captures the trade-off between the two most important exit choices: IPOs and trade sales. The model shows that highly profitable companies that need few oversight will go public, while less profitable companies that require more control will be sold in a trade sale. This suggests that the common notion that IPOs per se are more profitable than sales is wrong and observed returns suffer from a measurement bias. This is consistent with empirical evidence that IPOs have indeed higher rates of return than trade sales.Keywords
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