Bargaining in an Asymmetrical Power Structure
Open Access
- 1 January 1981
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Marketing
- Vol. 45 (1) , 104-115
- https://doi.org/10.1177/002224298104500110
Abstract
This study utilized a gaming experiment to compare the bargaining processes and outcomes in an asymmetrical power structure against those of a more balanced setting. Bargaining in the unbalanced condition was more “efficient,” but terms of agreement were much less predictable, and some weak members failed to obtain valued resources.Keywords
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