Bidder behavior in central bank repo auctions: Evidence from the Bundesbank
- 31 July 2006
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money
- Vol. 16 (3) , 215-230
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intfin.2005.02.003
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
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