Policy Boards and Policy Smoothing*
- 1 February 2000
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 115 (1) , 305-339
- https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300554665
Abstract
Partisan politics and random election outcomes generate policy uncertainty and partisan business cycles. To reduce policy uncertainty, society must dKeywords
This publication has 11 references indexed in Scilit:
- Money, politics and the post-war business cycleJournal of Monetary Economics, 1999
- Partisan control of the money supply and decentralized appointment powersEuropean Journal of Political Economy, 1997
- A Theory of Divided GovernmentEconometrica, 1996
- Whom can we trust to run the Fed? Theoretical support for the founders' viewsJournal of Monetary Economics, 1996
- Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the EconomyPublished by Cambridge University Press (CUP) ,1995
- Monetary Policy Games and Central Bank PoliticsJournal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1989
- Equilibrium Inflation as Determined by a Policy CommitteeThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1988
- Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated GameThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1987
- Reputational constraints on monetary policy a commentCarnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 1987
- A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric InformationEconometrica, 1986