Corporate Board Composition, Protocols, and Voting Behavior: Experimental Evidence
- 11 September 2003
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Finance
- Vol. 58 (5) , 1997-2031
- https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00595
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 20 references indexed in Scilit:
- Do outside directors monitor managers?: Evidence from tender offer bidsPublished by Elsevier ,2002
- Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performancePublished by Elsevier ,2000
- Cheap Talk, Fraud, and Adverse Selection in Financial Markets: Some Experimental EvidenceThe Review of Financial Studies, 1999
- THE ACTIVE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND ITS EFFECT ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE LARGE PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONJournal of Applied Corporate Finance, 1999
- The decline of takeovers and disciplinary managerial turnoverJournal of Financial Economics, 1997
- An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate electionsInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1996
- The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control SystemsThe Journal of Finance, 1993
- Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional InvestorsStanford Law Review, 1991
- The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm PerformanceFinancial Management, 1991
- Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. ConceptsJournal of Economic Theory, 1987