Optimal Trading by a 'Large Shareholder'
Preprint
- 1 January 2001
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
A large shareholder who undertakes costly effort to improve a firm's dividends faces a tradeoff. Selling shares will likely lower the share price (as the markeKeywords
This publication has 56 references indexed in Scilit:
- Monopoly Power and the Firm's Valuation: A Dynamic Analysis of Short versus Long-Term PoliciesSSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
- Optimal Incentive Contracts When Agents Can Save, Borrow, and DefaultJournal of Financial Intermediation, 1999
- Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate ControlThe Journal of Finance, 1998
- Consumption choice and asset pricing with a non-price-taking agentEconomic Theory, 1997
- Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the FirmThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1997
- Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market EquilibriumJournal of Political Economy, 1994
- Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior under Limited RegulationMichigan Law Review, 1994
- Private benefits from control of public corporationsJournal of Financial Economics, 1989
- Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods MonopolyEconometrica, 1989
- The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market MechanismThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1970