Cutting environmental penalties to protect the environment
- 1 May 1996
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 60 (2) , 251-265
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(95)01531-0
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 15 references indexed in Scilit:
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