Executive Salaries as Tournament Prizes and Executive Bonuses as Managerial Incentives in Japan
- 1 September 1997
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of the Japanese and International Economies
- Vol. 11 (3) , 319-346
- https://doi.org/10.1006/jjie.1997.0373
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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