Manipulation via Capacities in Two-Sided Matching Markets
- 1 November 1997
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 77 (1) , 197-204
- https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2316
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 12 references indexed in Scilit:
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