Evolutionary Stability in Alternating-Offers Bargaining Games
- 1 June 1998
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 80 (2) , 257-291
- https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2387
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
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