Speculative Attacks and Informational Structure: an Experimental Study
- 8 August 2006
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Review of International Economics
- Vol. 14 (5) , 797-817
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2006.00608.x
Abstract
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