Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players
- 1 May 2004
- journal article
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 72 (3) , 823-852
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00513.x
Abstract
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