Contracting with Externalities
- 1 May 1999
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 114 (2) , 337-388
- https://doi.org/10.1162/003355399556016
Abstract
The paper studies contracting between one principal and N agents in the presence of multilateral externalities. When the principal commits to publiclKeywords
All Related Versions
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