Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games
- 1 August 1991
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 3 (3) , 278-294
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90029-e
Abstract
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This publication has 9 references indexed in Scilit:
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