The interaction between financial and employment contracts: A formal model of Japanese Corporate Governance
- 30 September 1992
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of the Japanese and International Economies
- Vol. 6 (3) , 247-274
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0889-1583(92)90023-w
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 19 references indexed in Scilit:
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