Finite automata play repeated prisoner's dilemma with information processing costs
- 1 January 1996
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 20 (1-3) , 173-207
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(94)00848-1
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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