Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils
- 20 January 2010
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 41 (1) , 179-198
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00095.x
Abstract
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This publication has 40 references indexed in Scilit:
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