Bad Reputation
- 1 August 2003
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 118 (3) , 785-814
- https://doi.org/10.1162/00335530360698423
Abstract
We construct a model where the reputational concern of the long-run player to look good in the current period results in the loss of all surplus. This is in contrast to the bulk of the literature on reputations where such considerations mitigate myopic incentive problems. We also show that in models where all parties have long-run objectives, such losses can be avoided.Keywords
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