To Attack or Not to Attack
- 1 September 1990
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 34 (3) , 531-552
- https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002790034003007
Abstract
Specific theoretical conditions for the success or failure of extended immediate deterrence (EID) are identified based on assumptions about rational action. The resultant decision theoretic model yields four hypotheses which are tested against cases of EID between 1885 and 1970. The hypotheses are strongly supported, with about 77% of outcomes correctly predicted. In addition, the article distinguishes between two qualitatively different situations in which the model leads us to expect a defender's policy of extended immediate deterrence to succeed or fail. The results are contrasted with Huth's 1988 analysis. The formally derived hypotheses of this analysis fit the data as well as Huth's probit model. The percentage of correct predictions in the model here is slightly, but not statistically significantly, lower than that in Huth's, and the model presented here is more parsimonious than Huth's. Thus the model here seems to be a preferable construct of decision making during extended immediate deterrence situations.Keywords
This publication has 15 references indexed in Scilit:
- Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a DifferenceWorld Politics, 1990
- Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent VariableWorld Politics, 1990
- Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of WarAmerican Political Science Review, 1988
- Deterrence Failure and Crisis EscalationInternational Studies Quarterly, 1988
- Threat and alignment behaviorInternational Interactions, 1988
- Reason and WarAmerican Political Science Review, 1986
- Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1984
- What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980World Politics, 1984
- Influence Strategies, Success, and WarJournal of Conflict Resolution, 1979
- Measuring Systemic PolarityJournal of Conflict Resolution, 1975