Influence Strategies, Success, and War
- 1 December 1979
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 23 (4) , 655-684
- https://doi.org/10.1177/002200277902300404
Abstract
This article studies the effectiveness of influence strategies in serious dyadic disputes. Influence strategies are classified according to four types: bullying, reciprocating, appeasing, and trial-and-error. The study employs events data from twenty serious disputes occurring in the twentieth century. The findings support the central hypothesis that a reciprocating strategy is the most effective means of avoiding a diplomatic defeat without going to war, especially when it is employed against a bullying opponent. A closer look at the individual cases suggests that this is related to the face-saving properties of this approach, as well as the universal norm of reciprocity in international affairs.Keywords
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